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【背景】网约车与巡游车并存已成为城市客运交通的典型形态,构建二者的竞争模型有助于系统解析混合市场的内在机理与互动关系,并为出租车行业的规制与发展提供理论依据。然而,现有研究普遍忽略了乘客在实际场景中通过步行搜寻巡游车的行为,导致模型与现实之间存在一定偏差。【目标】针对这一研究空白,构建一个综合考虑乘客步行寻车行为与网约车司机工作时长决策的出租车市场集计模型,系统分析巡游车与网约车双模式服务的供需互动与市场竞争机制。【方法】基于供需均衡框架构建出租车市场集计模型,引入Cobb-Douglas匹配函数描述司乘双向搜索。通过数值算例求解均衡结果,并开展参数灵敏度分析。【结论】忽略步行寻车行为会显著高估乘客未被服务时间,偏差将随其关于等待时间的弹性减小和步行成本增加而增大;巡游车市场份额在运力充足时将被高估,运力不足时则被低估。此外,网约车司机自主决策工作时长时,“无效追逐”(WGC)现象仍然可能存在,但提高司机分成比例有助于改善网约车的供给效率,从而削弱这一现象。【应用】通过将乘客步行寻车行为引入建模框架,有效修正了传统模型中乘客未被服务时间与市场占有率估计的系统性偏差,提供了更贴近现实的理论模型,对政府制定运力调控、平台佣金监管等政策具有参考价值。
Abstract:[Background] The coexistence of ride-hailing taxis and street-hailing taxis has become a typical pattern in urban passenger transportation. Developing a competition model for these two modes helps to systematically analyze the internal mechanisms and interactions within this mixed market, thereby providing a theoretical basis for the regulation and development of the taxi industry. However, existing studies lack a characterization of passengers’ walk-and-search behavior in realistic street-hailing scenarios, leading to deviations between model predictions and actual conditions. [Objective] To address this gap, an aggregate taxi market model is developed, which incorporates both passengers’ walk-and-search behavior and ride-hailing drivers’ working time decisions. It systematically investigates the supply-demand interactions and market competition mechanisms between the two taxi modes. [Methods] An aggregate taxi market model is constructed based on a supply-demand equilibrium framework. A Cobb-Douglas matching function is introduced to characterize the bilateral search between drivers and passengers, while accounting for ride-hailing drivers’ flexible working hours. Equilibrium outcomes are derived through numerical examples, and parameter sensitivity analysis is conducted. [Conclusion] Neglecting walk-and-search behavior leads to an overestimation of passengers’ unserved time, with the deviation increasing as the elasticity of waiting time decreases and walking cost rises. The market share of street-hailing taxis is overestimated when supply is sufficient and underestimated when supply is insufficient. Additionally, when ride-hailing drivers can decide their working hours, the “Wild Goose Chase” (WGC) phenomenon may still occur, but increasing the driver commission rate helps improve the supply efficiency of ride-hailing services, thereby mitigating this phenomenon. [Application] By incorporating walk-and-search behavior into the modeling framework, this study effectively corrects the systematic biases in estimating unserved time and market share in traditional models. It offers a more realistic theoretical model with practical implications for governmental policies on fleet size regulation and platform commission supervision.
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基本信息:
DOI:10.19961/j.cnki.1672-4747.2026.03.011
中图分类号:O29;F572;F724.6
引用信息:
[1]刘天亮,卢飞宇,王皓.考虑步行寻车的巡游网约并存出租车市场建模[J].交通运输工程与信息学报().DOI:10.19961/j.cnki.1672-4747.2026.03.011.
基金信息:
国家自然科学基金项目(72171010,72288101)
2026-04-02
2026-04-02
2026-04-02